VZCZCXRO1075 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHVEN #0205/01 2650627 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 220627Z SEP 09 FM USMISSION USOSCE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6589 INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1384 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0827 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1325

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000205

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC: 1540 BEST PRACTICE GUIDE MOVES FORWARD UNDER
SILENCE PROCEDURE

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, Reason 1.4B/D

- 11. (SBU) Summary: After two years, the 1540 best practice guide appears to be moving forward in the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). It is now under a silence procedure and should move to the FSC plenary for adoption as early as September 30. Meanwhile, on 16 September Deputy SACEUR General Sir John McColl briefed the FSC plenary on strategic priorities, emphasizing Afghanistan and Western Balkan operations. Inter alia, McColl helpfully suggested OSCE could assist ISAF Operations in election support and borders. The FSC also heard Finnish State Secretary Pertti Torstila's presentation of a White Paper on European Security. End Summary.
- ¶2. (SBU) Finnish MFA State Secretary Pertti Torstila presented the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defense Policy. Torstila highlighted OSCE's continuing relevancy in advancing comprehensive security. He noted Finnish interests include effective multilateralism, credible national defense, European Union membership as a "fundamental security choice," and the role of NATO and Partnership for Peace as the mechanism for trans-Atlantic cooperation. Torstila underscored there was no place for "zero-sum games," and highlighted the important roles for EU, NATO, COE, and OSCE as each brought a comparative skill and advantage to the concept of comprehensive security. A key component for addressing the current and emerging challenges to European Security was the further development of civil-military capabilities and interoperability. Torstila applauded the multidimensional approach to security undertaken by NATO (ISAF, NRC, Strategic Concept, etc. and NATO-EU-UN cooperation ("key enablers"), and the proper venue for OSCE to address issues related to European Security (Corfu, FSC, Arms Control, etc. as vital components to Finland's national interests. He said, "The Helsinki Process has contributed markedly to the security and stability in Europe and has also opened perspectives for change. The CSCE grew into a full fledged organization, and I hope it will soon get a legal

capacity to further consolidate that role."

13. (SBU) DSACEUR McColl followed Torstila's presentation with a sharply focused assessment of the operational tempo for European and Trans-Atlantic military forces deployed in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans. Wearing both hats (DSACEUR and EUFOR Operational Commander), McColl described the roles and purposes for NATO's deployments, its accomplishments in Afghanistan (progress made with the development of Afghan National Forces since 2002), and the continuing issues of violence in Southern Afghanistan (Kandahar Province), poppy and narcotic production, and the challenges posed by incessant corruption. McColl noted that in Kosovo, NATO forces in support of local and EULEX roles, successfully created a secure environment that now permits NATO to begin in 2010 the initial of three KFOR draw downs ("gates"). He also briefed on Operation Allied Endeavor, Ocean Shield, EUFOR Althea, and the importance of NATO and EU coordination. McColl was critical about the impact of weak information and intelligence sharing among the organizations engaged in each of there theaters. He noted that although ad hoc arrangements have been made by commanders on the ground, the absence of an agreed protocol for information sharing (e.g., between NATO, EU, and UN commands), presented a tangible threat to mission success and unnecessarily exposed troops to risks in the field. In response to a U.S. (Neighbor) question, McColl said OSCE could best assist in Afghanistan with election support, governance, and rule of law capacity building.

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Working Groups A and B

¶4. (SBU) There were no substantive issues for Working Group B (WGB). There were substantive issues in Working Group A (WGA). Under Vienna Document, The Chair (UK) noted comments were due by COB 9/24 on the draft decision on the dates and venue of the twentieth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM -- FSC.DD/7/09). A special WGA will be held prior to the FSC plenary to adopt the decision. Sweden endorsing the decision was the only delegation that spoke.

Regarding the VD99 Best Practice Guide (BPG) on Implementation of Chapter IV, Contacts (FSC.AIAM/8/09/Rev.2), Russia, which co-sponsored the draft with the UK, noted delegates had sufficient time for study and feedback and that inputs received have been incorporated into the text. The WGA accepted U.S. suggested edits that emphasized welcoming the development of the BPG "for implementation of" the VD99 Chapter IV. Contacts" in the draft decision (FSC.DD/6/09). Canada announced that it expected to provide its comments to the UK Chair later in the week.

Turkey continued consultations among delegates and requested the Chair to retain as an agenda item the proposal for a draft decision on digital cameras and GPS in the application of VD99 compliance and verification measures (FSC.DEL/124/09).

The CPC noted that FSC.GAL/94/09 regarding the Announcing Mechanism had been posted and that November 15 was the deadline for Provision of Information on Contacts (VD99, Chapter IV, Sec 36-37; Annual Calendars (VD99, Chapter VII, Sec 61-63); and Constraining Provisions (VD99, Chapter VIII, Sec 67-71).

There were no comments under WGA agenda item 3 (SALW), item 4 (Stockpiles of Conventional Armaments, or item 5 (Code of Conduct on Pol-Mil Aspects of Security.

Under WGA agenda item 6 (all other agreed CSBMs), Turkey requested an additional sentence in the third paragraph (preamble) to the OSCE Best Practices Guide (BPG) on UN

Security Council Resolution 1540 Export Controls and Transhipment (FSC.DEL/65/09/Rev.2/Corr.1). The added sentence ("Effective export controls made at states of origin are of utmost significance") generated no comments from Delegates. The Chair also took on board some minor U.S. fixes that clarified language within the draft BPG, and reissued a revised Draft Decision. The Chair gave delegates until September 24 to make comments on the BPG on 1540 Export Controls. Barring any unexpected turns, the Chair expects the decision to be approved in the WGA during the special session in advance of the September 30 FSC plenary, so it can be formally adopted by the plenary itself later that same morning.

15. (C) Comment: Both guests' presentations in the FSC were well-received and non-controversial. The styles of the two diplomatic and military briefs were particularly contrasted in the question and answer periods (which were relatively anodyne and short). While Torstila was attentive to put Finnish views of European Security interests in perspective, careful to support current institutional arrangements, the respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and a healthy discussion of European Security issues within the framework of the current architecture, he also balanced the three dimensions (security, human, and economic) as necessary to any successful conclusions within the framework of the

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Helsinki Final Act. McColl, on the other hand, made clear his requirements were to improve the ability of European and Trans-Atlantic forces to perform at their best. He underscored that the conflicts in all theaters cannot be resolved through military actions, but rather through information and intelligence sharing, and working at both grass roots and official levels to build civilian and military capacities for stable and secure governments and institutions under local controls. He noted that only then would the desirable end-state — the return home of his soldiers — be obtained. End Comment.